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I. INTRODUCTION

Immigration policies can represent a country’s effort to circumscribe
a national culture. Beyond merely regulating the size and diversity of a
population, these policies also attempt to shape a nation’s identity and
social order. 1 As Daniel J. Tichenor—in his Dividing Lines: The Politics
of Immigration Control in America—writes, nations “define themselves
through the official selection and control of foreigners seeking permanent
residence on their soil.” 2 The United States is no exception, having used
its immigration policy to define itself, at least in part, through national
notions of morality. 3
The United States has made admissibility and deportability decisions
based on foreigners’ moral conduct since 1891, when Congress expressly
excluded from entry noncitizens who had committed a crime involving
“moral turpitude” (CIMT). 4 Legislative history on the matter suggests that
this represented an attempt to establish a national system of morals.5
Rather than excluding noncitizens based on inherently wrongful conduct
(or conduct that would be considered morally turpitudinous in their
countries of origin), noncitizen conduct was judged according to U.S.
standards. 6 Perhaps the most explicit acknowledgment of Congress’s
effort to create a national morality comes from case law; the “obvious
Congressional purpose [of the moral turpitude provision] is to keep
persons who are likely to be undesirable residents or sojourners from
being in our midst.” 7
Though the decision to enforce a national system of morality (and to

1. DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN
AMERICA 1 (2002).
2. Id.
3. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 350 (1950).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 351-54.
6. Id. at 351.
7. Knoetze v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 201, 231 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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hold noncitizens to this standard) makes some sense, 8 it has also posed
certain challenges as cultural norms are not static; they inevitably change
as society progresses. 9 Therefore, the definition of “moral turpitude” has
proven elusive, and efforts to develop an acceptable framework for its
application have failed. 10
This is problematic because our application of the phrase “moral
turpitude” is of profound importance for noncitizens. 11 For those seeking
lawful entrance into the United States, for instance, a conviction of a
CIMT renders them ineligible to receive a visa and ineligible for
admission. 12 For those who have already been properly admitted to the
country (lawful permanent residents), the commission of a CIMT can
result in their removal. 13 Undocumented aliens are especially at risk of
deportation. 14 While these noncitizens can typically request that the
Justice Department prevent their deportation, this discretionary relief is
not available for those who have been convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude. 15 Given its severe consequences, a conviction of a CIMT
is clearly undesirable for a noncitizen. But without a uniform definition
for the phrase “moral turpitude,” defense attorneys often struggle to

8. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 353 (“While the visa instructions define moral turpitude as an act
which in itself is one of baseness, vileness, or depravity, the applicability of the excluding provision
often depends on what the individual officer considers to be baseness, vileness, or depravity.”).
9. Id. at 351.
10. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has already rejected a “void for vagueness”
argument. In Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951), the court determined that “difficulty in
determining whether certain marginal offenses are within the meaning of the language under attack
as vague does not automatically render a statute unconstitutional for indefiniteness.”
11. Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, The Categorical Approach for Crimes Involving Moral
Turpitude After Silva-Trevino, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 316 (2011) (“The current INA imposes
severe immigration penalties on a noncitizen, including a lawful permanent resident (LPR), for a
CIMT conviction, such as inadmissibility, deportation, and ineligibility for discretionary adjustment
of status.”).
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (“[A]liens . . . are ineligible
to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States [if] . . . convicted of, or . . . admits
having committed or . . . admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a crime
involving moral turpitude”.).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (stating that any alien who
has been convicted of a CIMT and who could face a sentence of one year or longer, can be removed).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(2)(A)(i) (2016) (“[A]ny alien who . . . is convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude committed within five years . . . after the date of admission, and . . . is convicted of a
crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is deportable.”).
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2016) indicates that “[t]he Attorney General may cancel removal of,
and adjust the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is
inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien . . . has not been convicted of an offence
under 1182(a)(2) . . . of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2016) provides that any alien
convicted of “a crime involving moral turpitude . . . or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a
crime” is inadmissible.
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provide adequate advice to their clients, not knowing whether a plea
bargain will result in their client’s removal from the country. 16
In this Article, I explore the creation, collapse, and recreation of a
uniform framework for the application of the “moral turpitude” provisions
in immigration law. Part II demonstrates that the collapse of the previous
framework was instructive; it showed that identification of a CIMT hinges
on the noncitizen’s conviction, not the specific conduct that led to the
conviction. Part III details the modern framework that the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) has applied to identify CIMTs—the realistic
probability test. In Part IV, I criticize the BIA’s modern framework. I,
instead, advocate for application of the least culpable conduct test—an
approach that limits the applicability of the phrase “moral turpitude.”
Unlike the realistic probability test, the least culpable conduct test has a
rich legal history and preserves a noncitizen’s access to justice. Part V
concludes that whether the circuit courts owe deference to the BIA’s
modern framework is immediately questionable.
II. A HISTORY OF IDENTIFYING CIMTS
The BIA has offered a general definition of the phrase “moral
turpitude,” indicating that it refers to behavior that is “inherently base,
vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the
duties owed between persons or society in general.” 17 The Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), however, neither defines the phrase “moral
turpitude” nor establishes a framework with which to apply this language;
as a result, courts have historically developed inconsistent applications of
the act’s moral turpitude provisions. 18

16. See Eric H. Singer, The Muddle of Determining Moral Turpitude After Silva-Trevino, 45
MD. B.J. 54, 57 (2012) (“In short, after Silva-Trevino, your client may be left holding the proverbial
bag after all, and you and your fellow practitioners and enforcement authorities are certainly left with
what can be described only as an intellectual mess.”); Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better Than the
Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime,
26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 259 (2012) (“Indeed, the process of determining whether a given criminal
conviction triggers an immigration sanction can require extensive analysis of criminal and
immigration statutes, prior caselaw, and scrutiny of the criminal record of conviction. At times, it is
not an assessment that can be made quickly, or with obvious answers.”).
17. In re Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 949 (B.I.A. 2014).
18. See Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26
I. & N. Dec. 550 (“The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Federal courts have long struggled in
administering and applying [the INA’s] moral turpitude provisions.”); Dadhania, supra note 11, at
317 (“Despite its severe ramifications and long history, moral turpitude is not defined in the INA. The
legislative history of federal immigration statutes using the term suggests that the precise definition
should be formulated by administrative and judicial decisions.”).
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Silva-Trevino I: The Creation of a Uniform Three-Step Analysis

In 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey addressed this issue in
Matter of Cristoval Silva-Trevino I; his opinion established a “uniform
framework” for the application of the INA’s moral turpitude provisions. 19
In this case, the respondent was a citizen of Mexico lawfully admitted to
the United States as a permanent resident. 20 After he entered a plea of no
contest to the offense of “indecency with a child,” 21 the Department of
Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. 22 The
respondent requested discretionary relief from removal, arguing that the
Texas statute under which he was convicted does not require a defendant
to have knowledge of a child’s age in order to be found guilty. 23 The
respondent, therefore, reasoned that the statute “permits convictions in
cases that do not involve moral turpitude,” such as in cases “where the
defendant honestly and reasonably believed his sexual contact was with a
consenting adult.” 24 The immigration judge rejected the respondent’s
argument, but the BIA reached a different conclusion and indicated that
the respondent was eligible for discretionary relief. 25 The BIA held that
the respondent’s “conviction, whatever its actual facts, should not be
considered a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude because [the
Texas statute] criminalizes at least some conduct that does not involve
moral turpitude.” 26
Here the BIA applied a specific categorical approach—called the
“least culpable conduct” test—to identify a CIMT. Under this framework,
the court looks only at the respondent’s conviction, determines the
statutory elements necessary for that conviction, and asks whether morally
turpitudinous behavior is required to meet those elements. 27 If one can
conceive of a theoretical scenario where the statute can be violated
without morally base conduct, the crime is not considered a CIMT. 28
Rejecting the BIA’s application of the least culpable conduct test,

19. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688.
20. Id. at 690.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 691.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 692.
27. Dadhania, supra note 11, at 326 (“The least culpable conduct test considers whether moral
turpitude would inhere in the minimum conduct sufficiently to satisfy the elements of the offense.”);
Koh, supra note 16, at 283 (“[The] courts must identify the least culpable conduct that could possibly
violate the statute.”).
28. Supra note 27.
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Attorney General Mukasey certified the case for review and applied a new
approach to identify CIMTs—one that allowed inquiry beyond the statute
of conviction. 29 Mukasey set forth a three-step analysis, indicating that
adjudicators should first determine whether there is a realistic chance
(rather than a theoretical possibility) that a statute reaches conduct that
does not involve moral turpitude. 30 Where this first step proves
inconclusive, immigration judges were to look at the respondent’s “record
of conviction, including documents such as the indictment, the judgment
of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea
transcript.” 31 Finally, if consideration of this record still did not resolve
the inquiry, the third step allows judges to consider any other evidence
necessary to “resolve accurately the moral turpitude question.” 32
Applying this rule, Mukasey remanded the case to the BIA. 33 He reasoned
that whether the respondent “knew or should have known the victim’s age
is a critical factor in determining whether his . . . crime involved moral
turpitude for immigration purposes.” 34
Mukasey’s three-step analysis represented a novel approach to the
identification of CIMTs. Though it contained elements of traditional
categorical approaches, its third step deviated substantially from accepted
norms. The first step of Mukasey’s analysis mirrors a type of categorical
approach called the “realistic probability” test. 35 Under this test, a
noncitizen must prove that there is a realistic probability that a statute
could be violated without morally turpitudinous conduct. 36 To meet this
burden, the noncitizen must point to specific cases where a defendant was
found to have violated the statute without engaging in morally
turpitudinous behavior. 37 Mukasey’s second step exemplifies a “modern
categorical approach.” This approach is typically applied when a statute
contains several portions, some of which can be violated without morally
turpitudinous behavior and others that cannot. 38 When this is the case, a
judge can look beyond the statute, consider the noncitizen’s individual
29. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 696.
30. Id. at 698.
31. Id. at 704.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 705.
34. Id.
35. Dadhania, supra note 11, at 327.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 328 (“Adjudicators focus on the actual scope of the statute of conviction by asking
whether any actual case exists where the criminal statute was applied to conduct that was not
turpitudinous. A noncitizen must provide evidence of an actual case where the statute in question was
used to prosecute conduct not involving moral turpitude.”).
38. Id. at 329.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss2/8

6

George: On Moral Grounds

2017]

ON MORAL GROUNDS

583

“record of conviction,” and determine what portion of the statute the
noncitizen violated. The record of conviction consists of several
documents (all related to the specific conviction in question): the charging
document, the plea agreement, the record of the sentence, the plea
colloquy transcript, the indictment, or the jury instructions. 39 If the inquiry
is not resolved after looking at these documents, Mukasey’s approach
allowed the judge to go one step further and look into facts outside the
record—whatever facts he deemed necessary. This third step broke from
tradition and gave judges a great deal of discretion; with “Silva-Trevino,
the previous limitations that prevented the immigration court from
viewing the record and evidence supporting the conviction [were]
essentially discarded, which significantly [increased] the risk of
inconsistent application of the moral turpitude law.” 40
Following Mukasey’s opinion, the BIA remanded the case back to
the immigration judge, who applied the Attorney General’s new rule and
determined that the respondent was ineligible for discretionary relief from
removal. 41
B.

The Deterioration of Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I Standard

Far from establishing a uniform interpretation of the phrase “moral
turpitude,” the third step of Mukasey’s framework led to disagreement
among the circuits—with some giving deference to his approach and
others deciding that it was a clear violation of language contained in the
INA. 42
A minority of circuit courts—consisting only of the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits—decided to apply the Silva-Trevino I standard. 43 In MataGuerrero v. Holder, an alien from Mexico sought a waiver of
inadmissibility; he argued that his conviction for failing to register as a

39. See Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (indicating that the charging
document, plea agreement, verdict or judgment of conviction, record of the sentence and the plea
colloquy transcript are part of the “record of conviction”); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602
(1990) (indicating that the indictment and the jury instructions are parts of the “record of conviction”).
40. Nathanael C. Crowley, Comment, Naked Dishonesty: Misuse of a Social Security Number
for an Otherwise Legal Purpose May Not be a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude After All, 15 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 205, 221 (2013).
41. Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 2014).
42. Matter of Cristoval Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 552 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015) (“[F]ive
courts of appeals [have] . . . rejected the third step of Attorney General Mukasey’s framework as
contrary to the unambiguous language of the statute and thus refused to accord the Silva-Trevino
opinion deference.”).
43. Id.
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sex offender (as required under Wisconsin law) was not a CIMT.44
Though the immigration judge and the BIA decided that the petitioner had
committed a CIMT, the Seventh Circuit remanded and instructed the BIA
to apply Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I standard. 45 In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that Chevron deference “assumes that an
agency has taken a careful look at the general legal issue and has adopted
a reasonably consistent approach to it.” 46 Because the BIA had only
applied a categorical approach to determine that the petitioner had
committed a CIMT, the Seventh Circuit instructed the BIA to conduct an
“individualized inquiry” into the petitioner’s conviction—a fact-specific
inquiry consistent with the third step of the Silva-Trevino I standard. 47
In a similar case, the Eighth Circuit also afforded Chevron deference
to the Attorney General’s approach. In Bobadilla v. Holder, an alien from
Canada was convicted of giving a false name to a peace officer. 48 Though
the BIA decided that the alien’s offense was categorically a CIMT, the
circuit court remanded. 49 It found that the BIA had failed to apply the first
step of the Silva-Trevino I standard and did not determine if there was a
realistic probability that a conviction could arise from conduct that was
not morally turpitudinous. 50
Though the Seventh and Eighth Circuits decided to apply Mukasey’s
Silva-Trevino I standard, most other circuits rejected Mukasey’s
framework. The Third Circuit became the first to do so in 2009. 51 In JeanLouis v. Attorney General of the United States, the appellant was a native
citizen of Haiti. 52 After he pled guilty to committing simple assault against
a child under 12 years of age, the Department of Homeland Security
declared the appellant removable under the INA. 53 The appellant admitted
removability but sought to cancel his removal, contending that
cancellation was appropriate because he had resided in the United States
for a period of seven years. 54 An alien’s period of continuous residency

44. Mata-Guerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 257 (7th Cir. 2010).
45. Id. at 261.
46. Id. at 259.
47. Id. at 261.
48. Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1053 (8th Cir. 2012).
49. Id. at 1059.
50. Id.
51. Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 582 F.3d 462, 470 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We
conclude that deference is not owed to Silva-Trevino’s novel approach and thus will apply our
established methodology.”).
52. Id. at 464.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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terminates, though, when the alien is convicted of a CIMT. 55 Both the
immigration judge and the BIA determined that the appellant’s conviction
of simple assault constituted a CIMT. 56 But the circuit court reversed,
holding that the appellant was not convicted of a CIMT.57 The court
adhered to its own precedent on the matter, applied a least culpable
conduct test, and expressly rejected Mukasey’s novel three-step
analysis. 58
The Third Circuit criticized step one of the Silva-Trevino I
framework, stating that application of a realistic probability test is
impracticable; unlike the least culpable conduct test, it does not allow
courts to develop a body of case law that decides “whether various state
criminal statutes fall within the scope of the ‘crime involving moral
turpitude’ offense.” 59 The Third Circuit also rejected the third-step in the
Silva-Trevino I framework. The INA uses the term “convicted” when
discussing crimes involving moral turpitude. 60 According to the court, this
term “forecloses individualized inquiry into an alien’s specific conduct
and does not permit examination of extra-record conviction.” 61
After the Third Circuit rejected Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I standard,
several others followed suit. 62 And upon reviewing the Silva-Trevino I
case in 2014, the Fifth Circuit became the latest circuit to reject Mukasey’s
framework. 63 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that when a statute is
ambiguous and an implementing agency’s interpretation of that statute is
reasonable, Chevron demands that the court apply the agency
interpretation. 64 But, like the Third Circuit, the court analyzed what it
called the “convicted of” clause of the INA and found no ambiguity and,
thus, no reason to give deference to Mukasey’s interpretive framework. 65
55. Id.
56. Id. at 465.
57. Id. at 482.
58. Id. at 470.
59. Id. at 482 (internal citation omitted).
60. Id. at 474.
61. Id.
62. See Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 716 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A CIMT . . . [is] a
generic crime whose description is complete unto itself, such that ‘involving moral turpitude’ is an
element of the crime. Because it is an element of the generic crime, an IJ is limited to the record of
conviction.”); Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We conclude that the plain
language of the moral turpitude statute is not ambiguous.”); Farjardo v. United States Att’y Gen., 659
F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We agree with the Third and Eighth Circuits that Congress
unambiguously intended adjudicators to use the categorical and modified approach to determine
whether a person was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.”).
63. Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2014).
64. Id. at 199.
65. Id. at 200.
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The act provides that “any alien convicted of . . . a crime involving moral
turpitude” is inadmissible, 66 and, as a result, the alien is also ineligible for
discretionary relief. 67 The court stated that the legislature established a
limited list of documents that “may be considered as proof of such a
conviction,” and there is no evidence that additional extrinsic evidence
may be considered to identify a CIMT. 68 Finding that the legislature
unambiguously limited the court’s inquiry to the record of conviction, 69
the Fifth Circuit joined four other circuit courts in refusing to give
deference to Mukasey’s three-step framework. 70
Following the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of the Silva-Trevino I
framework, Attorney General Eric Holder issued an opinion—known as
Silva-Trevino II—and expressly vacated Mukasey’s approach:
In view of the decisions of five courts of appeals rejecting the framework
set out in Attorney General Mukasey’s opinion—which have created
disagreement among the circuits and disinformation in the Board’s application of immigration law—as well as intervening Supreme Court decisions that cast doubt on the continued validity of the opinion, I conclude that it is appropriate to vacate the . . . opinion in its entirety. 71

After Holder’s decision to vacate the Silva-Trevino I three-step approach,
it became clear that immigration judges could not look beyond a
noncitizen’s record of conviction to determine whether he committed a
CIMT. But courts were left without a national standard for determining
whether a crime involved moral turpitude. 72
C.

Confusion Following the Rejection of Silva-Trevino I

The lack of a clear standard led to confusion, and court decisions
following Holder’s opinion possessed limited precedential value. This is
demonstrated by the Seventh Circuit’s Arias v. Lynch decision, where it
considered the following question: does social security number (SSN)
misrepresentation necessarily involve morally turpitudinous behavior? 73
The petitioner was an Ecuador native who came to the United States

66. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2016).
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2016).
68. Silva-Trevino, 742 F.3d at 200.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
71. Matter of Cristoval Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550, 553 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2015).
72. Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e remand to the Board to consider
Arias’s case under an appropriate legal framework for judging moral turpitude.”).
73. Id. at 824.
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without authorization in 2000. 74 During her time in the States, the
petitioner worked at a cabinet company in order to support her three
children. 75 In 2010, the petitioner was sentenced to just one year probation
for a conviction of falsely using a SSN in order to obtain employment at
the cabinet company; the indictment charged her with an intent to deceive
her employer. 76 After the petitioner served her year-long probation,
however, she received employment authorization and was rehired by the
same cabinet company. 77 As the court put it, the company “did not have a
problem with [the petitioner’s] deception and does not view itself as a
victim.” 78 Nevertheless, in 2010, the petitioner was asked to appear for
removal proceedings; she admitted removability but requested
discretionary relief. 79
The immigration judge held that discretionary relief was unavailable
because the petitioner had committed a CIMT.80 On appeal, the BIA
reached the same conclusion. 81 Acknowledging that the Silva-Trevino I
framework had been vacated, the BIA claimed only to look at the record
of conviction and concluded that a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B)
categorically involves morally turpitudinous behavior. 82 The BIA held
that “‘[a]n intent to deceive for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining a
benefit is an element of the offense, and therefore the offense is
categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.’” 83
Though the BIA expressly stated that its inquiry was limited to the
petitioner’s record of conviction, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case
and found that the BIA—whether it did so knowingly or not—looked
beyond petitioner’s conviction and, therefore, wrongly applied the
vacated Silva-Trevino I approach. 84 The Seventh Circuit reached this
conclusion by looking at the language of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B). 85 That
statute criminalizes the misrepresentation of a SSN in order to either
receive a benefit or for any other purpose. 86 The Seventh Circuit pointed
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
obtaining
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out that the BIA’s opinion selectively quoted the statute, only including
language regarding the misuse of a SSN to obtain a benefit. 87 The court
reasoned, then, that the BIA tailored the statute to the petitioner’s specific
situation, acknowledged that the petitioner misused a SSN to obtain the
benefit of employment, and deemed the crime an instance of moral
turpitude; in other words, the BIA must have incorrectly applied the
vacated Silva-Trevino I standard, looking beyond the record of conviction
to consider the petitioner’s specific conduct. 88 As a result, the Seventh
Circuit remanded the case to the Board in order to “consider [petitioner’s]
case under an appropriate legal framework for judging moral turpitude.” 89
This case highlights the problems that arise when a uniform standard
has not been adopted. First, the Seventh Circuit was simply unable to
resolve the petitioner’s issue. The court could merely defer the case to the
BIA and request that it develop a uniform standard. Second, the Seventh
Circuit’s decision seems oddly contradictory, as it had to make
assumptions regarding the BIA’s approach to the identification of CIMTs.
Consider the following inconsistency. The court first acknowledged that
the petitioner’s specific conduct shows that she only committed a
victimless crime; yet, it concluded that the BIA must have considered this
specific conduct in order to conclude that the petitioner’s crime was
morally turpitudinous.
III. SILVA-TREVINO REVISITED: THE MODERN FRAMEWORK
In response to both judicial confusion regarding this area of the law
and Attorney General Eric Holder’s decision to vacate the Silva-Trevino
I standard, the BIA revisited the Silva-Trevino case and articulated the
current standard for identifying CIMTs. Once circuit courts established
that an immigration judge cannot look beyond a noncitizen’s record of
conviction, it logically followed that the BIA had to apply a traditional
categorical approach: either the realistic probability test or the least
culpable conduct test. It chose to apply the realistic probability test, the
same categorical approach that was to be applied under step one of the
vacated Silva-Trevino I standard. 90
deceive, falsely represents a number to be the social security account number assigned by the
Commissioner of Social Security to him or to another person . . . shall be guilty of a felony.”
(emphasis added in text).
87. Arias, 834 F.3d at 830.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 831 (B.I.A. 2016) (“In evaluating the
criminal statute under the categorical approach, unless circuit court law dictates otherwise, we apply
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In other words, it does not matter whether a scenario can be imagined
where a statute can be violated without morally turpitudinous behavior.
Instead, under this realistic probability test, there has to be a realistic
chance that a statute could be applied to conduct that does not constitute
moral turpitude. 91 A noncitizen can meet this burden by pointing to a
specific case where the statute was violated without morally base
behavior. 92 As is the case with any categorical approach, the realistic
probability test forbids inquiry into the noncitizen’s specific behavior. 93
Only when a statute contains multiple provisions—some that reach
morally turpitudinous behavior and others that do not—can the court look
beyond the statute and consider the noncitizen’s record of conviction.94
This record can only be used for the limited purpose of determining under
what part of the statute the noncitizen was convicted. 95
Applying this new standard, the BIA analyzed the Texas statute
criminalizing indecency with a child, noted that conviction under this
statute does not require knowledge of the victim’s age, and, therefore,
concluded that the respondent’s crime does not categorically involve
moral turpitude. 96
IV. ARGUMENT: THE BIA SHOULD APPLY THE LEAST CULPABLE
CONDUCT TEST
Silva-Trevino I was vacated because it incorrectly allowed a judge to
look beyond a noncitizen’s record of conviction. Thus, the BIA was
correct to apply a traditional categorical approach to the identification of
CIMTs. But no categorical test is perfect. Because neither the realistic
the realistic probability test. This requires us to focus on the minimum conduct that has a realistic
probability of being prosecuted under the statute of conviction, rather than on the facts underlying the
respondent’s particular violation of that statute.”).
91. See Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26
I. & N. Dec. 550 (“Imagination is not, however, the appropriate standard under the framework set
forth in this opinion. Instead, the question is whether there is a ‘realistic probability, not a theoretical
possibility,’ that the Texas statute would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral
turpitude.”) (internal citation omitted).
92. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 831.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 833 (“In cases where the statute of conviction includes some crimes that involve
moral turpitude and some that do not, adjudicators must determine if the statute is divisible and thus
susceptible to a modified categorical analysis. Under such an analysis, resort to the record of
conviction is permitted to identify the statutory provision that the respondent was convicted of
violating.”).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 835 (“Because section 21.11(a)(1) is broad enough to punish behavior that is not
accompanied by the defendant’s knowledge that the victim was a minor, the offense does not
necessarily involve moral turpitude.”).
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probability test nor the least culpable conduct test considers the
noncitizen’s specific conduct, it is inaccurate to suggest that either
categorical approach is truly equipped to assess a noncitizen’s morality.
When we acknowledge this reality, we must reach the following
conclusion: the categorical approach that most favors the noncitizen must
be applied, 97 for it is the noncitizen facing the severe consequence of
removal. Not only does a history of strong legal precedent support this
conclusion, but our notions regarding access to the legal system demand
it.
A.

Legal Precedent Requires Application of the Least Culpable
Conduct Test
1. Historically, the Least Culpable Conduct Test was Widely
Accepted

Prior to Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I opinion, application of the least
culpable conduct test was common. In that opinion, Mukasey suggested
that the circuit courts have traditionally applied differing categorical tests,
with some applying the realistic probability test and others applying the
least culpable conduct test. 98 This characterization may not have been
entirely accurate. 99 Research suggests that the least culpable conduct test
has a much richer history than does the realistic probability test. Thus,
Mukasey was correct to point out that the Third and Fifth Circuits have
historically applied the least culpable conduct test. 100 But his claim that
the First and Eighth Circuits applied the realistic probability test was
97. See infra Part II. The Supreme Court has recognized that removal is akin to a criminal
punishment, in that it is a particularly severe legal consequence. As a result, the Court has consistently
held that noncitizens facing removal—like defendants in a criminal case—are afforded certain
protections. Among those protections is the immigration rule of lenity. Just as criminal statutes are to
be interpreted in a manner that favors the accused, the immigration rule of lenity mandates that
immigration statutes be interpreted in favor of the noncitizen. See infra Part II.
98. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 693 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 I. &
N. Dec. 550 (“The absence of an authoritative administrative methodology for resolving moral
turpitude inquiries has resulted in different approaches across the country.”).
99. Cate McGuire, Note, An Unrealistic Burden: Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude and SilvaTrevino’s Realistic Probability Test, 30 REV. LITIG. 607, 623 (2011) (“In highlighting the perceived
lack of uniformity among circuits in applying the . . . [realistic probability test], the Attorney General
referred to the First and Eighth Circuits as having ‘considered the “general nature” of the crime and
its classification in “common usage’’’ to make the moral turpitude determination.”) (citing Matter of
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N Dec. at 693-94).
100. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693. The Third and Fifth Circuits, for example,
have held that convictions under a criminal statute may categorically be considered crimes involving
moral turpitude only if an examination of the statute reveals that even the most minimal conduct that
could hypothetically permit a conviction necessarily would involve moral turpitude. Id.
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probably an overstatement. 101
An analysis of case law shows that the least culpable conduct test is
deeply embedded in our legal history. From as early as 1939, circuit courts
applied reasoning that resembled the least culpable conduct test. In United
States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, for instance, the Second Circuit considered
whether the noncitizen’s conviction for possession of a jimmy (a small
crow bar) with the intent to commit a crime was a CIMT. 102 The court
reasoned that the answer to this question turns on the intended illicit use
of the jimmy. 103 The court recognized, however, that deporting officials
may not consider the noncitizen’s particular conduct that gave rise to the
conviction. 104 Therefore, the court decided that the noncitizen’s
possession of a jimmy with the intent to commit a crime is only a CIMT
so long as “all crimes which he may intend are ‘necessarily’, or
‘inherently’, immoral.” 105 In other words, the court applied the least
culpable conduct test, identifying the minimal conduct for which a person
can be convicted under the statute. The court concluded that youthful boys
often use a jimmy to forcefully enter buildings out of a love for mischief,
conduct that the court considered entirely innocent. 106 As the court put it,
“[s]uch conduct is no more than a youthful prank, to which most highspirited boys are more or less prone; it would be to the last degree pedantic
to hold that it involved moral turpitude and to visit upon it the dreadful
penalty of banishment.” 107
The Fifth Circuit borrowed the Second Circuit’s reasoning. In its
Hamdan v. INS case, the petitioner had been convicted under Louisiana’s
simple kidnapping statute. 108 The petitioner argued that the Louisiana
statute defines five categories of kidnapping, one of which criminalizes
removal of a child by a parent lacking custody. 109 Citing the Second
Circuit’s Guarino v. Uhl decision, the court provided: “absent specific
evidence to the contrary in the record of conviction, the statute must be
read at the minimum criminal conduct necessary to sustain a conviction
under the statute.” 110 Because the statute extends to at least some conduct

101.
102.
omitted).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 189.
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that is not inherently morally turpitudinous, the court remanded the case
to the BIA to determine (from the record of conviction) under what section
of the statute the petitioner had been convicted. 111
The Fifth Circuit again applied this logic in 2006. In Amouzadeh v.
Winfrey, the petitioner had been convicted of two crimes: knowingly
procuring naturalization contrary to law and drug trafficking. 112 In
determining whether these crimes involved morally turpitudinous
behavior, the Fifth Circuit applied the least culpable conduct test, stating
that the statute should be read at “its minimum.” 113 If the statute might
criminalize conduct that is not morally turpitudinous, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned, then the conviction is not one involving moral turpitude. 114
Though the court only considered the minimum conduct necessary to
sustain the petitioner’s convictions, the petitioner was found to have
committed two CIMTs (as both of his convictions required a culpable
state of mind). 115
Following the Second Circuit’s Guarino v. Uhl decision and the Fifth
Circuit’s Hamdan decision, other circuits followed suit and chose to apply
the least culpable conduct test. In Partyka v. Attorney General, the Third
Circuit considered whether a petitioner’s conviction under a New Jersey
aggravated assault statute constituted a CIMT. 116 Indicating that it must
“ascertain the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a conviction
under the statute,” the court considered the elements of New Jersey’s
aggravated assault statute. 117 The language of that statute permits
convictions based on the negligent infliction of bodily harm. 118 As a
result, the court reached this conclusion: “the hallmark of moral turpitude
is a reprehensible act committed with an appreciable level of
consciousness or deliberation. The negligent infliction of bodily injury
lacks this essential culpability requirement.” 119
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit applied the same categorical approach in its
Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler decision. In that case, the petitioner was
convicted of a California statute that prohibits a person 21 years-old or
older from engaging in sexual intercourse with any person under the age

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 458.
Partyka v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 417 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 411.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 414.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss2/8

16

George: On Moral Grounds

2017]

ON MORAL GROUNDS

593

of 16. 120 Again, the court looked not at the petitioner’s specific conduct
but at the entire range of conduct prohibited by the statute. 121 The court
theorized that this specific statute could criminalize consensual
intercourse between a college sophomore and a high-school junior and
that the relationship could have begun when both were high school
students. 122 Given this theoretical scenario, the court decided that the
statute criminalizes at least some behavior that is not morally
turpitudinous; “such behavior may be unwise and socially unacceptable
to many, but it is not ‘inherently base, vile, or depraved.’” 123
The cases discussed above demand the following realization: prior to
Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I decision, there was strong legal precedent
supporting application of the least culpable conduct test. The same cannot
be said for application of the realistic probability test in the context of
CIMTs.
2. The Emergence of the Realistic Probability Test is Based on
Faulty Logic Contained in Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I Opinion
According to the BIA’s modern standard, immigration judges must
apply the realistic probability test. A noncitizen must prove that there is a
realistic chance that a statute could be applied to conduct that is not
morally turpitudinous. This differs from the least culpable conduct test in
that it requires a noncitizen to point to an actual case where a particular
statute was violated without moral turpitude.
Unlike the least culpable conduct test, this realistic probability test
has a shallow history. Its application to the identification of CIMTs is
largely born out of Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I opinion—an opinion that
employed questionable logic to support its conclusions.
First, in support of his application of the realistic probability test,
Mukasey incorrectly relied upon the Supreme Court’s holding in
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez. 124 (The BIA’s modern framework has
borrowed this reasoning and also overstates the Duenas-Alverez
holding. 125) Although the Supreme Court applied a realistic probability
120. Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 2007).
121. Id. at 692.
122. Id. at 693.
123. Id. (citing Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1996)).
124. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) (“Moreover, in our view, to find
that a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute
requires more than the application of legal imagination to a state statute’s language. It requires a
realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that
falls outside the generic definition of a crime.”).
125. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (B.I.A. 2016).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 8

594

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[51:577

test in that case, it did not do so in order to identify morally turpitudinous
conduct, and it remains unclear whether the Supreme Court’s reasoning
can extend beyond the context in which the Duenes-Alverez case was
decided. 126
In Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, the respondent faced deportation
after he was convicted under a California statute that criminalizes theft of
a vehicle (and aiding and abetting a theft of a vehicle).127 Because the INA
calls for removal when a noncitizen has been convicted of a generic theft
offense, 128 the federal government began removal proceedings against the
respondent. 129 A major issue in this case can be articulated as follows:
does the California statute criminalize generic theft offenses?
The respondent argued that his conviction was not an adequate
ground for removal. He claimed that the California statute criminalized
behavior that most jurisdictions would not consider “theft”; he said that
“California’s doctrine, unlike that of most other States, makes a defendant
criminally liable for conduct that the defendant did not intend, not even as
a known or almost certain byproduct of the defendant’s intentional
acts.” 130 In support of this contention, the respondent suggested that a
person who wrongly purchased alcohol for an underage drinker could be
convicted under the California statute for that drinker’s unforeseen
reckless driving. 131 While the immigration judge and the BIA found the
petitioner to be removable, the Ninth Circuit held that the California
statute extends to conduct that is not generic theft and remanded the case
to the BIA. 132 The Supreme Court, however, vacated the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. 133
According to the Supreme Court, the respondent’s argument failed
because it was rooted in fiction, not fact:
To find that a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition
126. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013). The Supreme Court has decided at least one
other case where it cited its own Duenas-Alvarez decision. The Supreme Court’s subsequent
discussion of the case’s holding, however, does nothing to suggest that the realistic probability test
can be used to identify CIMTs. Instead, it merely quotes language from the Duenas-Alvarez decision
and applies this language to a case regarding the classification of a drug trafficking conviction. Id.
127. Gonzales, 549 U.S. at 187-89.
128. 8 USC § 1227 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (“Any alien who is convicted of an
aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”); 8 USC § 1101(a)(43)(G) (LEXIS
through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (“[A]ggravated felony means . . . a theft offense . . . or burglary offense
for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.”).
129. Gonzales, 549 U.S. at 187.
130. Id. at 191.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 184, *syllabus.
133. Id. at 188.
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of a listed crime in a federal statute requires more than the application
of legal imagination to a state statute’s language. It requires a realistic
probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its
statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime. 134

The Supreme Court stated that the respondent could demonstrate this
realistic probability by either pointing to his own case or to another case
where a court actually applied the statute to the conduct that respondent
described. 135
Several circuit courts criticized Mukasey’s decision to apply this
holding to the identification of CIMTs. In its Jean-Louis decision, the
Third Circuit “seriously doubt[ed] that the logic of the Supreme Court in
Duenas-Alvarez . . . is transferable to the CIMT context.” 136 In the
Duenas-Alvarez case, the respondent’s theoretical/imaginary criminal
conduct—buying alcohol for an underage drinker—may not have even
been a violation of the California statute criminalizing theft of a vehicle. 137
Proper application of a least-culpable conduct test, according to the Third
Circuit, does not involve this kind of “imagination.” 138 When the elements
of a statute are clearly enumerated, the theoretical scenario can
unmistakably meet those elements; speculation as to whether the conduct
can lead to a conviction is unnecessary. 139
After incorrectly citing the Supreme Court’s Duenas-Alvarez case to
support his application of the realistic probability test, Mukasey then
asserted that some circuit courts have also used this test to identify
CIMTs. 140 Specifically, Mukasey mentioned the First Circuit’s Pino v.
Nicolls decision and the Eighth Circuit’s Marciano v. INS decision. 141
Again, these cases did not clearly support application of the realistic
probability test.
In its Pino v. Nicolls decision, the First Circuit merely recognized
that there is criticism regarding categorical approaches because they do
134. Id. at 193.
135. Id.
136. Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 582 F.3d 462, 481 (3d Cir. 2009).
137. Id. (“In fact, the parties vigorously disputed whether California courts would permit
application of the statute to a defendant who had committed acts resulting in a crime, but where the
commission of the crime itself was not intended.”).
138. Id.
139. Id. (“Here, by contrast, no application of ‘legal imagination’ to the Pennsylvania simple
assault statute is necessary. The elements of 2701 are clear, and the ability of the government to
prosecute a defendant under subpart 2701(b)(2)—even where the defendant is unaware of the victim’s
age—is not disputed.”).
140. See Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 694 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26
I. & N. Dec. 550.
141. Id.
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not allow the immigration judge to consider facts beyond the record of
conviction. 142 In that case, the issue was whether the petitioner had been
convicted of a crime of larceny, not whether the crime of larceny should
be classified as a CIMT. 143 Therefore, the First Circuit’s discussion
regarding the identification of CIMTs is only considered dicta.
In this discussion, the court acknowledged that the accuracy of
categorical approaches are limited: if pure motives result in criminal
activity (like the theft of food for one’s hungry child or the stealing of a
turkey as a college prank) and these pure motives do not constitute a legal
defense, a categorical approach cannot recognize those pure motives. 144
Nevertheless, the court concluded that immigration judges should not
assess a noncitizen’s specific conduct:
if the crime in its general nature is one which in common usage would
be classified as a crime involving moral turpitude, neither the administrative officials in a deportation proceeding nor the courts on review of
administrative action are under the oppressive burden of taking and considering evidence of the circumstances of a particular offense. 145

Mukasey interpreted the “general nature” and “common usage” language
as an endorsement of the realistic probability test. 146 Others have
interpreted this language differently, contending that the First Circuit did
not actually subscribe to a realistic probability approach. Instead, it merely
emphasized that categorical approaches forbid judges to look beyond the
noncitizen’s record of conviction and consider the noncitizen’s actual
conduct. 147
To further support his claim that the circuits were divided as to which
categorical approach to apply, Mukasey cited the dissenting opinion of the
Eighth Circuit’s Marciano v. INS decision. 148 Though the dissent
characterized the majority as having applied a realistic probability

142. Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237, 245 (1st Cir. 1954).
143. Id. (“Appellant has made no contention in this court that the crime of larceny is not properly
to be classified in the general category of crimes involving moral turpitude. It is well-settled that, in
ordinary acceptation, the crime of larceny, whether grand or petty, is a crime involving moral
turpitude.”).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 694 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 I. &
N. Dec. 550.
147. McGuire, supra note 99, at 624 (2011) (“In other words, the court was emphasizing the
importance of the categorical approach. Because criminal statutes by their plain language do not make
non-criminal intentions an affirmative defense, moral turpitude will necessarily inhere even when the
underlying facts demonstrate pure intentions.”).
148. 450 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1971).
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approach, it is unclear whether the majority actually did so. 149
In the Marciano case, the petitioner was an alien from Morocco who
was convicted of statutory rape under a Minnesota statute.150 The
petitioner argued that his conviction was not a CIMT because the statute
criminalizes sexual relationships with a person between the ages of 16 and
18 years of age without requiring proof of criminal intent. 151 In assessing
the petitioner’s argument, the majority never mentioned application of the
realistic probability test. Instead, the court cited prior cases regarding
statutory rape, 152 and it looked at the record of conviction to determine
that the petitioner knew of the victim’s age. 153 The majority then held that
the petitioner had committed a crime involving morally turpitudinous
behavior. 154
Only the dissenting judge deliberated over how to properly identify
CIMTs. 155 He criticized the First Circuit’s Pino v. Nicolls decision,
claiming that it was wrong to look only at the “general nature” of a statute
to determine whether that statute is used to criminalize morally
turpitudinous conduct. 156 The dissenting judge claimed that the majority
had, in effect, adopted this logic. 157 But it does not appear that the
dissenting judge criticized the majority for applying what he considered a
realistic probability test; instead, it seems as though he was critical of all
categorical approaches, as they do not allow consideration of the
noncitizen’s specific conduct. 158 In fact, despite concerns regarding
149. McGuire, supra note 99, at 624.
150. Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1023.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1025 (“Federal courts have consistently held that statutory rape is a crime involving
moral turpitude.”).
153. Id. (“The court also found and determined that [the petitioner] was told by his victim that
she was fifteen or sixteen years of age prior to the commission of the offense, that the petitioner had
sexual intercourse with the victim on the date charged, and that petitioner was the aggressor.”).
154. Id. (“The Board properly determined that the statutory rape charge upon which the
petitioner was convicted is a crime involving moral turpitude.”).
155. Id. at 1026 (Eisele, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 1028 (Eisele, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree that Pino v. Nicolls adopted the best rule
when it asked that the Service and the reviewing courts look only to the ‘general nature’ of the crime
and its classification in ‘common usage.’”).
157. Id. (Eisele, J., dissenting) (“The majority here takes the same approach, and this is the point
at which my disagreement begins.”).
158. Id. at 1029 (Eisele, J., dissenting) (“Since moral turpitude is different from criminality, the
statute seems to require that that element be assessed separately. Undoubtedly it is difficult for the
Service to make continual determinations of the nation’s shifting and often indistinct moral standards.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that such determinations are what the law requires. Considerations of
administrative convenience should certainly be secondary to the determination and enforcement of
the obvious legislative intent. It may or may not be wise to charge an administrative agency with this
sort of duty, but Congress has done so and the Supreme Court has said that the standard provided is

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

21

Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 8

598

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[51:577

judicial efficiency, the dissenting judge advocated for a factual inquiry
into the petitioner’s actual behavior. 159
A close reading of the cases discussed in Silva-Trevino I shows
that—unlike the least culpable conduct test—the realistic probability test
was not widely applied prior to 2008. To the contrary, application of the
realistic probability test in the context of CIMTs seems to be based on
unsound legal reasoning. (It is worth noting that in its latest Silva-Trevino
III opinion, the BIA cited several circuit cases that have applied the
realistic probability standard; most of those cases, however, merely
adopted this standard based on the Silva-Trevino I opinion. 160)
As one scholar concluded, this “erosion of immigration law
precedent is based largely on a faulty interpretation of a Supreme Court
case combined with mischaracterization of the tests employed by the
various circuits when applying the categorical approach.” 161
B.

The Realistic Probability Test Violates the Immigration Lenity
Doctrine

Not only is the realistic probability test the product of questionable
legal reasoning, it may also constitute a violation of the immigration lenity
doctrine.
In Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, the Supreme Court recognized that
deportation is a “drastic measure”—that it “is the forfeiture for
misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a
penalty.” 162 From that decision, the immigration lenity doctrine emerged;
the Supreme Court decided that deportation decisions are to be construed
strictly in favor of the noncitizen. 163 Since that decision, the Supreme
Court—along with lower courts—has consistently maintained the
immigration lenity doctrine. 164 (Moreover, there is legal evidence to
suggest that this doctrine does not merely apply to issues of deportability,
but that its applicability extends to issues of admissibility as well. 165)
sufficiently definite that administrators will be able to apply it.”).
159. Id. at 1031 (Eisele, J., dissenting) (“On the present record, neither this Court, nor anyone
else, could accurately and fairly determine whether [petitioner’s] crime involved moral turpitude. I
would remand the case in order that this essential factual question might be determined.”).
160. Rodriguez-Heredia v. Holder, 639 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2011).
161. McGuire, supra note 99, at 636-37.
162. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
163. Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 519 (2003) (“The Supreme Court has a long history of
construing immigration statutes narrowly in favor of noncitizens in certain circumstances.”).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 525.
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For the reasons that follow, I propose that the BIA’s interpretation of
moral turpitude provisions violates the long-standing immigration lenity
doctrine. The BIA has not interpreted the INA in a manner most favorable
to noncitizens facing removal. Instead, its adoption of the realistic
probability test creates confusion, possibly limiting legal arguments
available to noncitizens and inappropriately placing a burden of proof on
noncitizens facing removal.
1. Unlike the Least Culpable Conduct Test, The Realistic
Probability Test Contains Ambiguities
The least culpable conduct test is unambiguous. To classify a
conviction as a CIMT, this test undoubtedly requires a reading of the
statute, a determination of the statute’s elements, and a finding that all
convictions under the statute require morally turpitudinous conduct. 166
Application of the realistic probability test is not nearly as clear.
As indicated above, the realistic probability test forces the court to
look at actual case law to identify a CIMT. To prove that his crime is not
a CIMT, a noncitizen must find a case demonstrating that the statute under
which he was convicted has previously been applied to conduct short of
moral turpitude. 167
It is unclear, however, what forms of evidence are acceptable to
prove the existence of such a case. At least one law review article provides
that acceptable forms of evidence include “published decisions,
unpublished decisions, and plea transcripts, including those from a
noncitizen’s own criminal case.” 168 The same law review article suggests
that when the noncitizen uses plea transcripts from his own criminal case,
the realistic probability test no longer functions as a strictly categorical
approach. It, instead, allows consideration of the facts underlying the
conviction and forces the court to determine if the noncitizen’s specific
conduct involved moral turpitude. 169
166. Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen. of United States, 582 F.3d 462, 465, 482 (3d Cir. 2009). The least
culpable conduct test merely requires the court to ascertain the elements of a statute and determine
whether all convictions under that statute involve moral turpitude. Therefore, courts applying this test
have been able to develop a body of precedent that details which convictions constitute CIMTs and
which do not. Id.
167. Dadhania, supra note 11, at 328 (“Adjudicators focus on the actual scope of the statute of
conviction by asking whether any actual case exists where the criminal statute was applied to conduct
that was not turpitudinous. A noncitizen must provide evidence of an actual case where the statute in
question was used to prosecute conduct not involving moral turpitude.”).
168. Id.
169. Id. at n.75 (“If a noncitizen uses her own case to demonstrate that the criminal statute has
been applied to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude, the court must determine whether her
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This is problematic for two reasons. First, Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino
I opinion was vacated because it allowed inquiry beyond a noncitizen’s
record of conviction and into the particular facts of the noncitizen’s case.
Circuit courts considered this external inquiry a clear violation of the
unambiguous language of the INA. 170 Use of the noncitizen’s own record
to satisfy the realistic probability test comes dangerously close to this
vacated inquiry, inasmuch as it requires courts to assess the noncitizen’s
actual conduct. 171 Second, the BIA’s latest framework seems to plainly
forbid the noncitizen from using facts contained in his own record to
satisfy the realistic probability test. The BIA’s latest framework states that
the record of conviction can only be considered when a statute is divisible;
it is permitted for the limited purpose of identifying “the statutory
provision that the respondent was convicted of violating.” 172
If a noncitizen cannot point to the facts of his own case to show that
a particular statute can be violated without moral turpitude, the realistic
probability test creates a very serious problem. It eliminates a potential
argument for a noncitizen who was convicted of a crime under an entirely
novel set of facts—perhaps the only set of facts that led to a particular
conviction without involving moral turpitude.
To illustrate this point, imagine that noncitizen Brinsley has been
convicted under State X’s hypothetical burglary statute. After Brinsley’s
landlord wrongly used self-help to retake possession of the house in which
Brinsley had been living, she found herself without access to shelter and
without adequate protection from the cold weather. To prevent the
possible onset of frostbite, Brinsley broke a storefront’s expensive
window, intending to steal a pair of winter boots she saw on a store shelf.
But as she left the scene, the store owner—who lived in an apartment
above the store—hurried down the stairs and called the police. Brinsley
was subsequently charged with burglary, which is defined in State X as
trespass in an occupied habitation with the intent to commit any criminal
offense. Brinsley’s defense of necessity failed, and she was convicted of
burglary. Following her conviction, removal proceedings were initiated
against Brinsley. In an attempt to obtain discretionary relief from removal,
Brinsley sought to establish that her conviction did not constitute a CIMT.
Though Brinsley’s actions may not seem morally depraved, there are no
actions involved moral turpitude, arguably going beyond a categorical approach. Although the
categorical approach generally forbids inquiry into the facts underlying a conviction, the realistic
probability test would permit such an inquiry under these circumstances.”).
170. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
171. Dadhania, supra note 11, at n.75.
172. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 833 (B.I.A. 2016).
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State X opinions that detail a burglary conviction resulting from conduct
that was short of moral turpitude.
Under the realistic probability test, Brinsley might not be able to
point to the facts of her own criminal case to establish that the statute can
be violated without morally turpitudinous behavior. Moreover, the court
would not be able to consider the entire range of hypothetical situations
that could lead to a burglary conviction. As a result, Brinsley’s conviction
might be inaccurately labeled a crime of moral turpitude.
2. The Realistic Probability Test Places a Heavy Burden of Proof
on the Noncitizen
It remains unclear whether a noncitizen will be able to satisfy the
realistic probability test with facts from his own case. But the fact that the
noncitizen has to point to facts of any case is problematic.
The INA details removability proceedings.173 These proceedings
govern both inadmissibility and deportability decisions, as both
determinations can lead to a noncitizen’s removal from the country. In a
proceeding that determines a noncitizen’s admissibility, the noncitizen
always bears the burden of proof. 174 In proceedings regarding
deportability, though, the INA places the burden of proof squarely on the
government; the “[s]ervice has the burden of establishing by clear and
convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been admitted
to the United States, the alien is deportable. No decision on deportability
shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence.” 175
Despite the fact that the INA provides these removability procedures,
the realistic probability test—as it is described in the Duenas-Alvarez
case—requires the noncitizen to show that the statute under which he was
convicted can be violated without morally turpitudinous conduct. 176 (He
does so by citing a case where the statute has been violated without moral
turpitude. 177) When the realistic probability test is applied during a
deportability proceeding, the realistic probability test may violate the
173. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (“In general. An immigration
judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”).
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-244) (“In the proceeding the alien
has the burden of establishing— (A) if the alien is an applicant for admission, that the alien is clearly
and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and is not inadmissible under section 1182 of this title; or
(B) by clear and convincing evidence, that the alien is lawfully present in the United States pursuant
to a prior admission.”).
175. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-244).
176. Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 192 (2007).
177. Dadhania, supra note 11, at 328.
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INA’s statutory language. Some have expressed concern that the test
impermissibly shifts the government’s burden of proof onto the
noncitizen. 178
The Third Circuit’s Jean-Louis v. Attorney General of the United
States decision addressed this concern:
Also unanswered is whether the government or the alien bears the burden of demonstrating a prior application of the statute of conviction to
non-turpitudinous conduct, and the applicability of unreported criminal
cases . . . Although the INA allocates the burden of establishing removability to the government . . . Duenas-Alvarez appears to shift this burden to the alien. 179

Even if application of the realistic probability test does not violate the
INA’s burden of proof provisions, the test still poses a practical problem
for many noncitizens facing removal.
Although noncitizens have a right to representation in immigration
court, 180 most go unrepresented. 181 And not surprisingly, those who go
without representation fare much worse in court. 182 Using relief from
removal and termination charges as measurements of an immigrant’s
success in court, one study concluded that there is a strong correlation
between representation and success. 183 For example, represented
noncitizens that had never been detained experienced legal success in 60%
of removal cases, while similarly situated pro se litigants experienced
success in just 17% of the same kind of cases. 184
By demanding that noncitizens provide evidence of case law during
removability proceedings, the realistic probability test could severely
hinder a noncitizen’s ability to succeed in court. Without representation,
178. McGuire, supra note 99, at 626 (“Courts criticizing the realistic probability test have noted
that it may impermissibly shift the burden of demonstrating realistic probability to defendant
noncitizens in deportation proceedings, even though the government has the burden of proof in
demonstrating removability.”).
179. Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 582 F.3d 462, 482 (3d Cir. 2009).
180. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2015).
181. Id. at 75 (“We reveal that during the time period of our study, 63% of all immigrants went
to court without an attorney. Detained immigrants were even less likely to obtain counsel—86%
attended their court hearings without an attorney.”).
182. Id. at 9 (“With respect to the efficacy of representation, we find that immigrants who are
represented by counsel do fare better at every stage of the court process—that is, their cases are more
likely to be terminated, they are more likely to seek relief, and they are more likely to obtain the relief
they seek.”).
183. Id. at 49 (“Using termination and relief as a combined measurement of success, we find
that both detained and nondetained immigrants with counsel had higher success rates.”).
184. Id. at 50.
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many noncitizens will not have access to bodies of case law. 185 Those that
do, may not know how to adequately interpret this law—as successful
interpretation would require a command on the English language and an
understanding of complicated legal vocabulary. 186 To put this into
perspective, there are significant requirements that must be met before one
can practice law. These include the following: acquisition of a bachelor’s
degree from an accredited institution,187 completion of a standardized
admissions test and a law school curriculum, 188 and passage of the bar
examination. 189
C.

Continued Disparities Between Different Jurisdictions Requires the
Development of a Truly Uniform Standard

When Attorney General Holder vacated the Silva-Trevino I decision,
he directed the BIA to develop a uniform framework for the identification
of CIMTs. 190 Strictly speaking, the BIA failed to do so. Recognizing that
some circuits have rejected application of the realistic probability test, the
BIA has allowed these jurisdictions to apply their existing precedent:
In light of this disparity, and in the interest of setting forth a uniform
national standard, we will apply the Supreme Court’s realistic probability test in deciding whether an offense categorically qualifies as a crime
involving moral turpitude, unless controlling circuit law expressly dictates otherwise. 191

The BIA’s language makes little sense. It concurrently expresses an
interest in the creation of a uniform standard and allows for different
jurisdictions to apply differing frameworks. That is hardly a uniform
standard.
On the one hand, this is comforting, as it suggests that circuit courts
that have traditionally applied the least culpable conduct test (like the
185. McGuire, supra note 99, at 629 (“Perhaps the greatest difficulty for most noncitizens who
must demonstrate realistic probability in such removal proceedings is the pervasive lack of legal
representation.”).
186. McGuire, supra note 99, at 629 (“Even assuming a perfect sample of reported cases, the
task will still be difficult. Most noncitizens’ proficiency in English is limited. Noncitizens trying to
demonstrate realistic probability using cases other than their own must be able to read and understand
the complicated English contained in legal resources. For these reasons, noncitizens will likely have
difficulty demonstrating realistic probability, even if one exists.”).
187. ABA Standards & Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, 2016 A.B.A. SEC. LEG.
EDUC. AND ADMIS. TO THE BAR 32.
188. Id. at 15.
189. Id. at 24.
190. Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 826 (B.I.A. 2016).
191. Id. at 832.
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Third and Fifth Circuits) will likely continue to do so. On the other hand,
the BIA’s failure to create a truly uniform framework presents its own
problems. First, the decision to develop a uniform framework for
assessing CIMTs emerged from the circuit courts’ longstanding struggle
to apply the INA’s moral turpitude provisions. 192 By allowing circuit
courts to apply differing categorical tests, the BIA has done nothing to
eliminate the “patchwork of different approaches” that Mukasey sought
to address in his Silva-Trevino I approach. 193 Additionally, inconsistent
approaches leads to a troubling realization: noncitizens’ morality will be
determined based on the jurisdiction’s categorical approach, rather than
on the conviction. One law review article stressed the importance of a
uniform framework; “A uniform policy would ensure that immigration
laws do not depend on the location of removal proceedings or on the
wording of criminal statutes, but on a consistent nationwide application
of the immigration laws.” 194
V. CONCLUSION
In an attempt to advance a national system of morals, the legislature
has long decided to base noncitizens’ deportability and admissibility—at
least in part—on the severity of their criminal activity. But making
consequential legal decisions based on a country’s notions of morality is
inherently problematic, as morality is a nebulous concept. It is subject to
change as society changes.
Not surprisingly, then, the circuit courts have historically struggled
to apply the INA’s moral turpitude provisions, oftentimes adopting
differing frameworks. Recognizing this problem, Attorney General
Mukasey established a standard approach to identify CIMTs. Though
Mukasey’s Silva-Trevino I standard has since been vacated, its collapse
has at least clarified one point: the INA forbids consideration of a
noncitizen’s specific conduct to determine whether a conviction involved
moral turpitude. In other words, immigration judges must effectively
assess a noncitizen’s morality without ever considering the noncitizen’s
behavior.
In response to the collapse of Silva-Trevino I, the BIA has revisited
this issue and has adopted a new, categorical approach to identify CIMTs.
192. See Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26
I. & N. Dec. 550 (“The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Federal courts have long struggled in
administering and applying the Act’s moral turpitude provisions, and there now exists a patchwork
of different approaches across the nation.”).
193. Id.
194. Dadhania, supra note 11, at 355.
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Under this approach, immigration judges are to apply the realistic
probability test, unless controlling circuit decisions have directed
otherwise. According to the BIA’s latest framework, a noncitizen can only
avoid removal by pointing to an actual case where the statute in question
has been violated with conduct not involving moral turpitude. This
standard is troubling: it lacks historical support; it places a heavy burden
of proof on underrepresented noncitizens; and it has done nothing to
establish a truly uniform approach to the identification of CIMTs. For
these reasons, the BIA’s latest framework might be classified as a
violation of the immigration lenity doctrine; it has failed to interpret the
INA’s moral turpitude provisions in a manner favorable to noncitizens.
The framework’s reasonableness, then, is immediately questionable, and
whether circuit courts owe it deference is unclear.
I have, therefore, advocated for the universal application of a
different categorical approach—the least culpable conduct test. This test
has a rich legal history and correctly places the burden of proof squarely
on the government. In order to remove a noncitizen, under this test, the
government must prove the following: the minimal conduct necessary for
a conviction under a given statute involves moral turpitude. This is
important. So long as immigration judges cannot look beyond a
noncitizen’s record of conviction to consider his particular behavior, the
categorical approach that most favors the noncitizen must be applied. That
approach is the least culpable conduct test.
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